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Abstract: 
 The aim of this study is to determine whether environmental taxes affect levels of 
pollution and energy consumption. Using a panel of EU members and Norway, we 
find a significant negative relationship between taxes and pollution, but no 
relationship with energy consumption. A further contribution to the literature involves 
the use of the Arellano-Bover approach to dynamic panels, to account for the potential 
partial adjustment towards desired or target levels of pollution and energy usage. The 
results provide evidence of partial adjustment, as well as evidence of the negative 
relationship between environmental taxes and pollution. 
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1. Introduction 
 As a result of recent concerns relating to the harmful effects of global warming, 
policy makers have become increasingly interested in the use of environmental 
taxation as a means of combating the problem. This research aims to address this 
issue, by determining whether environmental taxes have had any significant effect on 
the levels of air pollution and the complimentary phenomenon of energy consumption 
within the European Union (EU). Over the recent past, the EU members have been set 
voluntary targets for the reduction in pollution and consumption of hydro-carbon 
fuels, which have facilitated the sometimes controversial use of environmental taxes 
across the EU, including the countries that have recently joined. 
 
  To date the empirical literature on this issue has mainly concentrated on the use of 
simulation exercises rather than the use econometric modelling, due to the lack of 
suitable macro-data. This paper attempts to contribute to the debate on the 
effectiveness of environmental taxes, by using an EU panel data set to determine if 
there is any link between environmental taxes and air pollution and therefore whether 
the EU environmental policy to date has been successful. A further contribution to the 
literature involves the use of a partial adjustment based model in conjunction with a 
dynamic panel technique, to account for the target or desired nature of the dependent 
variable in this type of model. 
 
 During the 1990s, beginning with the Scandinavian countries, there have been a 
number of attempts to introduce Environmental Tax Reform (ETR) in EU members. 
This has involved shifting the burden of taxation away from factors of production to 
 4 
pollution and the users of natural resources, summarised as a move from economic 
‘goods’ to environmental ‘bads’
1
. One of the main ways in which EU governments 
have attempted to do this is through the use of energy taxes, in order to encourage a 
reduction in carbon emissions. Other options involve direct taxes on resource use and 
the removal of subsidies, which could be potentially harmful to the environment. 
However as a contrast to this interpretation of improving the environment, other 
studies such as Ekins and Speck (1999) have argued that any environmental taxes 
introduced by the EU have suffered from extensive exemptions by many industries, as 
a result of fears of uncompetitiveness. This has caused some of the most energy-
intensive industries in the EU to be exempted from taxation to prevent reduction in 
international competitiveness, which could undermine the effectiveness of these taxes. 
 
The main empirical work on environmental taxation has centred on the use of 
simulations on the impact of ETR on the environment, use of natural resources and 
the wider economy. Most of the studies conclude that increased environmental tax 
and ETR can have beneficial effects on the environment. (see Baranzini et al. (2000) 
and Bosquet (2000)). In addition there has recently been a substantial level of research 
into determinants of pollution and energy usage. Grossman and Krueger (1995) 
provided evidence for a non-linear relationship between per capita income and 
pollution, termed the ‘Environmental Kuznets Curve’, with an inverted U-shaped 
                                                 
1
 The approach to environmental taxation in the EU has concentrated on the use of taxes to improve the 
environment, whilst using the revenue raised to reduce the distortionary taxation on labour and 
production. This policy is often regarded as producing a double dividend whereby the environment is 
improved and at the same time the economy benefits through the reduction in these distortionary taxes 
(Bosquet (2000)). However a number of studies such as Goulder (1995) and Goulder (1996) suggest 
any benefits of the double dividend may be limited and depend on the levels of pre-existing taxes. 
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relationship, which has also been found in other studies (e.g. Antweiler et al. (2001) 
and Roca and Serrano (2007)). However other studies such as Stern and Common 
(2001) suggest the relationship could be monotonic, when using alternative 
approaches. Additional studies such as Antweiler et al. (2001) and Cole and Elliot 
(2004) suggest capital and investment in various forms are important determinants. 
Other studies have emphasised the inclusion of political variables, such as Neumayer 
(2003), as well as trade related variables as in Jaffe et al. (1995) although their effect 
on pollution is at best ambiguous. However as yet there is little evidence of fiscal 
factors being considered in this area of the empirical literature at the macroeconomic 
level
2
. 
 
 Following the introduction, the methodology used in this study is outlined and the 
form that ETR has taken in the EU member states discussed. The data and results are 
then examined and finally we suggest some conclusions and policy implications of the 
study. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
2.1 Modelling pollution and energy consumption 
 The model of the determinants of both pollution and energy consumption used in this 
study are partially based on the conventional approach suggested by Grossman and 
                                                 
2
 A related strand of the literature examines the effect of environmental taxes at the micro level, these 
studies use both simulation and econometric based approaches and in general find that using firm level 
data, the use of environmental taxes to reduce pollution has had at best mixed results (Millock and 
Lauges, 2006).  In a similar micro-based approach Brannlund et al. (2007) assess the use of energy 
based taxes on energy consumption. 
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Krueger (1995) and Cole and Elliot (2003) among others in which per capita GDP 
measures are used as determinants of pollution. Per capita capital formation is also 
included in the model, to proxy the ratio between capital and labour supply, as 
measures of capital and investment have proven to be important determinants in other 
models. The final determinant is the environmental tax imposed in each country 
included in this study. This produces the following relationship: 
 
 itititititit utaxpckpcypcypcpoll +++++= 43
2
210 ααααα  (1) 
 
Where pcpollit is per capita pollution (total greenhouse gas emissions) in the first 
model and per capita energy consumption (tonnes of oil equivalent) in the second 
complimentary model. Total emissions are used rather than individual pollutants in 
this study, as this is the measure the members are required to target in the EU.  pcyit is 
per capita real GDP, 2itpcy is per capita real GDP squared, pckit is the per capita 
capital formation and taxit is environmental taxes expressed as a proportion of both 
GDP and total tax revenue (All variables in logarithms, except taxes which are 
expressed as a percentage).  
 
 It is often assumed in the empirical literature that per capita income will have a non-
linear relationship with pollution, as originally observed by Grossman and Krueger 
(1995), so a squared per capita GDP measure is also included in the model. They 
incorporated this variable to account for the inverted U-shaped relationship, whilst 
also including a cubic version of this variable. The approach adopted here follows 
other studies, such as Stern and Common (2001) in including both a linear and non-
linear form of per capita GDP. Other studies have also incorporated lagged values of 
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per capita GDP, but as these are used as instruments in the dynamic panel model, they 
have not been included in this specification. The per capita capital variable should 
have a negative relationship, as increasing investment should facilitate the move to 
more advanced energy efficient production techniques. The environmental taxes 
should have a negative effect, assuming the exemptions have not significantly reduced 
their effectiveness, as either they encourage more efficient use of resources or a 
reduction in energy consumption. 
 
 In this study the environmental tax revenue as a proportion of GDP and total tax 
revenue is used as a proxy for the tax rate. The measure of environmental tax revenue 
is based on the internationally recognised definition used by the Statistical Office of 
the European Union (Eurostat) and accepted by the main international bodies, such as 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). An 
environmental tax is defined as any tax, which has a physical unit as a base and for 
which there is evidence that it has a specific effect on the environment
3
.  
 
 The data on environmental tax revenue is predominantly comprised of taxes on 
energy products, such as the duty charged on hydrocarbons in the transport sector, as 
well as the industrial sector. It also includes the fossil fuel levy, which is a tax on 
electricity generated using fossil fuels. A recently introduced tax is the climate change 
levy, including petroleum, gas, coal and electricity. Further related tax sources include 
                                                 
3
 As recognised in other studies, there is some debate over what counts as a tax, in particular the use of 
earmarked sources of revenue, as discussed in Newbery and Santos (1999). For the benefit of this study 
we rely on the definitions used by Eurostat, which is common across all the countries in the study. As 
noted earlier this is a macro based study using aggregated data for both taxes, pollution and energy 
consumption, data on a more disaggregated level is not currently available. 
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vehicle excise duty, the VAT applied to petroleum and the air passenger duty, which 
applies to air travel within the European Economic Area (EEA), but at a lower rate 
with countries outside the EEA. The other less important sources of environmental tax 
revenue relate to the mining and quarrying industries, landfill and the aggregates levy. 
 
 Although it is assumed the effect of environmental taxes on pollution and energy 
consumption should be negative, it may not be significant due to exemptions to 
energy-intensive industries. A number of studies have suggested that to maintain 
‘international competitiveness’, the effectiveness of these taxes has been reduced 
through offering exemptions to these industries. Ekins and Speck (1999) note that this 
is a feature of member states in the EU and has important implications for the 
effectiveness of these taxes and welfare costs for the economies concerned.  
 
 Ekins and Speck (1999) detail many examples of energy intensive industries, wholly 
or partially being exempted from the environmental taxes, including the Scandinavian 
countries. These exemptions can lead to the taxes being spread out on goods, which 
use little energy or for which demand is inelastic and therefore tend not to lead to any 
sizeable reduction in energy use or subsequent pollution. In addition, to restore 
competitiveness, pollution abatement subsidies are often used, however as 
Fredriksson (1997) has suggested, the interaction between the subsidy, tax rise and 
pollution, can in some circumstances even lead to a rise in pollution. The justification 
for these exemptions is not just economic, but also environmental, as if an industry in 
the EU becomes uncompetitive, it may switch production to a country outside the EU 
where environmental regulations and taxes are less stringent. Due to these concerns 
the EU approach to environmental policy has undergone a series of changes since 
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2001/2002, whereby the EU has stressed the need for co-ordination among the 
member states rather than trying to impose controls
4
.  
 
2.2 A dynamic panel approach to modelling pollution and energy consumption. 
 The above conventional approach assumes adjustment to the desired or target levels 
of pollution or energy consumption is rapid, however if we assume adjustment is only 
partial, we need to estimate an alternatively specified model, using a dynamic panel 
approach. The empirical model is then based on the partial equilibrium theory to 
account for any partial adjustment towards target levels of pollution. This may better 
reflect environmental policy in the EU more accurately, given that all member states 
have been allocated targets for their pollution levels under the Kyoto Protocol, 
including those countries which sought to join the EU during the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Therefore in equation (1), the dependent variable can be interpreted as a 
desired or target level of pollution or energy consumption ( *itpcpoll ). The partial 
adjustment mechanism takes the following format: 
 
  )*( 11 −− −=− itititit pcpollpcpollpcpollpcpoll λ    (2) 
 
 This indicates that the change in the level of pollution ( itpcpoll ) is proportional to 
the gap between its target level ( itpcpoll * ) and actual level
5
. This can be rearranged 
to form: 
                                                 
4
 In 2001 a report entitled: ‘Simplifying and Improving the Environment’ was first published, which 
has lead to a change in policy, from the EU being in charge of environmental policy to the individual 
member states being responsible. A discussion of EU environmental policy is beyond the scope of this 
study, but the European Commission (2005) among other reports provides a discussion of these issues.  
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  ititit pcpollpcpollpcpoll *)1( 1 λλ +−= −    (3) 
 
Where the termλ measures the speed of adjustment and is assumed to be positive, as 
the adjustment process should be both stable and non-fluctuating. The target level of 
pollution is assumed to be determined by the same explanatory variables as pollution 
in equation (1), then substituting it into (3) and rearranging produces the following 
estimating equation: 
ititititititit utaxpckpcypcypcpollpcpoll ++++++= − 64
2
32110 αααααα (4) 
 
Apart from accounting for the possible partial adjustment, there is a further reason for 
using an Arellano-Bover dynamic panel, which is to remove the individual effects in 
the panel as well as to take account of the potential endogeneity of the explanatory 
variables. Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) is used to estimate the model, 
using single lags of the transformed and non-transformed variables as instruments. 
The Arellano-Bover (1995) approach, used in this study involves using orthogonal 
deviations to remove the individual effects. Bond (2002) suggests the Arellano-Bover 
approach may have some advantages over other approaches to dynamic panel models, 
as it has better small-sample properties, and as long as the time series component is 
                                                                                                                                            
5
 The dynamic panel approach has been used in other contexts for estimating a partial adjustment based 
model, such as Cheng and Kwan (2000), although they used the Arellano-Bond approach. In addition 
to incorporating partial adjustment, it can also remove the potential problems of endogeneity and 
autocorrelation. This can provide an alternative to differencing the data, which could have resulted in a 
loss of long-run information. 
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reasonably small, as in this case, the estimator does not require time stationarity to 
hold. 
 
3. Data and Results 
 
 The data is all annual and runs from 1995 to 2006 and includes all the economies that 
are currently members of the EU
6
 and for which there is data, including those that 
joined the EU recently such as the transition economies (The list of countries is 
included in Table 1). Norway is also included in the panel despite not being a member 
of the EU, because along with the other Scandinavian countries it has been in the 
vanguard of those countries implementing policies aimed at benefiting the 
environment. Although the data covers the era, when some countries were not direct 
members of the EU, they were preparing to join and trying to conform to the more 
environmentally friendly policies that the EU encouraged over the sample period. 
 
 The data is taken from the Statistics Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) 
and includes real GDP, capital formation, the total population and the environmental 
tax revenue relative to both GDP and total tax revenue data. The data on pollution is 
an index defined as the total greenhouse gas emissions (CO2 equivalent). The 
                                                 
6
 The EU data is used due to the recent availability of its environmental tax data and the extensive 
literature on the implementation of environmental tax policy in the EU. In addition the definitions of 
both tax revenue and the pollution index are roughly common across the EU countries in the sample, 
ensuring the data shares the same features across the variables in the panel. However the data only 
starts in 1995 for many of the countries in the sample, limiting the dataset to just 300 observations. The 
data was taken from the Economic and Social Data Services (ESDS) website, which contains the 
Eurostat database. 
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consumption of energy is defined as ‘gross inland consumption’ in terms of thousands 
of tonnes of oil equivalent. Table 1 provides the summary tax statistics for each 
country, the tax revenue statistics suggest that most countries collect about 3% of 
GDP in environmental taxes, with the Scandinavian countries having the highest 
mean, whilst the transition countries have the lowest. With respect to total tax revenue 
collected, for most countries, the amounts collected are about 8%, with again the 
Scandinavian countries being particularly high
7
. However both Malta and Cyprus 
have the highest percentages, with 12% of tax revenue in Malta coming from 
environmental taxes, this may reflect the fact that they are new entrants to the EU and 
had to implement ETR prior to joining. 
 
  Table 2 contains the results using the measure of energy consumption and the related 
measure of pollution, as well as the two different measures of environmental tax 
revenue. Depending on the Hausman test, in which the null hypothesis is that random 
effects are consistent and efficient, the models are estimated using cross sectional 
fixed or random effects with Whites adjusted standard errors and covariances. In the 
first two models, the environmental tax relative to GDP and total taxes are negative 
and significant, suggesting as environmental taxes have risen, so air pollution within 
                                                 
7
 Dummy variables were included in the models to determine if different political groups of EU 
members have had different results. For instance an interaction dummy variable representing the 
Scandinavian countries interacting with the tax variables, who were the first and most enthusiastic 
members to implement environmental tax policy, were included in the dynamic panel to determine if 
they have had more success with controlling pollution than the other countries in the sample, but as it 
was insignificant it was removed.  Similar results were obtained when interaction dummy variables for 
Euro member states with tax were included. This result is in accord with other studies that have 
included political determinants, such as Neumayer (2003). 
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the EU has, as expected fallen, particularly with environmental taxes relative to the 
total tax revenue, which is significant at the 1% level, indicating that environmental 
taxes need to be considered in relation to other taxes, as suggested by Goulder (1995). 
However there is no significant relationship between taxes and consumption of 
hydrocarbons, this suggests that much of the reduction in pollution is through cleaner 
vehicles and less polluting technologies rather than a reduction in energy 
consumption. The sensitivity of the relationship between environmental taxes and the 
dependent variables depends on the definition of the tax variable, being roughly 
double for the tax relative to GDP measure. Where a 1% rise in tax relative to GDP 
produces a 3% decline in pollution. There is little evidence that per capita income in 
both the linear and non-linear form has had much effect on pollution, although it does 
appear to affect energy consumption. The level of capital appears to have a positive 
effect on both pollution and energy consumption, but is only significant in the first 
model. 
 
 Table 3 includes the results from the Arellano-Bover dynamic panel approach, to 
account for any partial adjustment in the models, using lags of the transformed and 
non-transformed variables in the model as instruments, with Sargan’s test accepting 
the null that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. These results are similar to the 
standard panel data models in Table 2 as they suggest environmental taxes only have 
a significant negative effect on pollution.  
 
 In the pollution model using environmental taxes relative to total taxes, capital has a 
significant negative effect as expected and in contrast to the non-dynamic 
specification, per capita income and per capita income squared are both negative and 
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only the squared term significant. The significant negative effect on capital suggests 
that capital investment has facilitated less environmentally damaging production 
techniques which are more fuel efficient. The income terms suggests that pollution 
and energy consumption, with respect to wealth, tend to follow a non-linear pattern as 
suggested by Grossman and Kreuger (1995). However the energy consumption model 
with the dynamic panel, per capita income is negatively signed but significant in one 
model and positive in the other, emphasising the complicated nature of the 
relationship between income and pollution. The highly significant and positively 
signed lagged dependent variables in all four specifications, show that there is strong 
evidence of partial adjustment to the desired or target levels of pollution, with about 
40% of adjustment occurring after one time period in the pollution models and about 
60% in the energy models, again emphasising the need to treat the dependent variable 
as a target in conjunction with a partial adjustment mechanism.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 This study suggests that the recent introduction of environmental taxes in the EU has 
had a significantly negative effect on pollution, but limited effect on the use of natural 
resources. This suggests that the myriad exemptions for energy-intensive sectors of 
the economy detailed in the literature have had only a limited effect on the efficacy of 
this policy. These results also provide support for those studies suggesting that the 
consequences of environmental taxes are dependent on the structure of other tax 
levels, as measuring environmental taxes relative to total taxes has the most 
significant effect. However there is mixed evidence on levels of income having any 
effect on pollution and energy consumption, as also found in other studies. 
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 There is evidence to support an alternative approach to modelling pollution and 
energy consumption, with these variables being treated as target or desired levels 
rather than the actual level, as is the case in the EU and increasingly in most other 
countries. In this case a partial adjustment mechanism in conjunction with a dynamic 
panel approach could offer an alternative to the conventional methodology used in the 
pollution literature and thereby produce a better specified overall model. The results 
indicate the presence of inertia, with between 40% and 60% of adjustment to the 
target or desired levels of pollution being accomplished annually. These results appear 
to suggest that taxes are predominantly determining the target level of pollution. 
 
 The policy implications of these results are that the current use of environmental 
taxes to reduce the EU’s present levels of pollution appear to be having some effect, 
although the relationship with other taxes needs to be considered. The lack of a 
significant effect on energy consumption, suggests environmental taxes are not 
reducing consumption, implying pollution is being reduced through the use of cleaner 
technologies. However future research will need to incorporate the effects of the use 
of environmental subsidies and renewable energy sources as they extend across the 
EU and as more data becomes available. In addition extended datasets with non-EU 
countries also need to be assessed, again as comparable tax data becomes available in 
the future. 
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Table 1 Summary Statistics regarding tax revenue (%) 
 % of GDP % of total tax 
Country mean variance mean variance 
Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Cyprus 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
2.44 
2.34 
2.57 
3.02 
5.23 
1.77 
3.13 
2.56 
2.38 
2.53 
2.99 
2.69 
3.16 
2.29 
1.80 
2.87 
3.48 
3.82 
2.44 
2.21 
3.19 
2.12 
2.85 
2.83 
0.05 
0.01 
0.02 
0.26 
0.17 
0.20 
0.02 
0.04 
0.03 
0.19 
0.06 
0.10 
0.09 
0.22 
0.12 
0.01 
0.10 
0.02 
0.53 
0.12 
0.06 
0.02 
0.01 
0.06 
5.66 
5.20 
7.30 
9.92 
10.66 
5.50 
6.93 
5.85 
5.93 
8.01 
7.72 
8.61 
7.59 
7.59 
6.12 
7.51 
11.94 
9.79 
5.70 
6.55 
9.41 
6.22 
5.72 
7.82 
0.25 
0.06 
0.07 
1.02 
0.64 
2.72 
0.12 
0.20 
0.27 
2.69 
0.30 
0.52 
0.50 
2.74 
1.38 
0.14 
3.55 
0.17 
2.76 
1.68 
0.97 
0.31 
0.05 
0.51 
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Table 2 Pollution and energy consumption models. 
 Pollution Pollution Energy 
Consumption 
Energy 
Consumption 
Constant 
 
Pcy 
 
Pcy
2
 
 
Pck 
 
Taxy 
 
Taxt 
 
Adjusted R
2
 
Effects 
Hausman 
Observations 
-11.249* 
(22.332) 
-0.004 
(0.033) 
0.001 
(0.046) 
0.034* 
(2.011) 
-2.96* 
(2.466) 
 
 
0.04 
random 
2.780 
300 
-11.445* 
(31.757) 
-0.119 
(0.757) 
-0.013 
(0.799) 
0.026 
(1.514) 
 
 
-1.744* 
(3.161) 
0.99 
fixed 
12.460 
300 
-2.094* 
(2.968) 
1.653* 
(5.894) 
0.134* 
(4.577) 
-0.081 
(1.460) 
0.064 
(0.351) 
 
 
0.23 
random 
8.344 
300 
-2.545* 
(3.541) 
1.512* 
(5.037) 
0.128* 
(3.832) 
0.051 
(0.664) 
 
 
0.075 
(0.115) 
0.98 
fixed 
14.599 
300 
Notes: T-statistics in parentheses, Variable names as in equation (1), A * (**) 
indicates significance at the 5% (10%) level of significance. All regression include 
fixed cross sectional effects and White cross section standard errors and covariances. 
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Table 3 Dynamic panel estimation of pollution and energy consumption models 
 Pollution Pollution Energy 
Consumption 
Energy 
Consumption 
Poll/En (-1) 
 
Pcy 
 
Pcy
2 
 
Ky 
 
Taxy 
 
Taxt 
 
J-statistic 
OIR(Sargan) 
Observations 
0.664* 
(41.064) 
0.051 
(0.492) 
0.002 
(0.241) 
-0.003 
(0.099) 
-1.627* 
(4.665) 
 
 
20.626 
0.419 
250 
0.610* 
(56.931) 
-0.081** 
(1.768) 
-0.016* 
(5.141) 
-0.052* 
(2.605) 
 
 
-0.735* 
(8.437) 
23.851 
0.249 
250 
0.431* 
(38.392) 
-0.575* 
(2.973) 
0.052* 
(2.500) 
-0.007 
(0.140) 
0.033 
(0.016) 
 
 
19.425 
0.494 
250 
0.402* 
(31.106) 
0.673* 
(2.431) 
0.060 
(0.182) 
-0.007 
(0.182) 
 
 
0.003 
(0.647) 
19.747 
0.474 
250 
Notes: Variables are as in Equation (4). OIR is the Sargan test for overidentifying 
restrictions, with the p-value included. All models estimated using GMM and 
orthogonal deviations, with White period instrument weighting matrix and standard 
errors and covariance matrix. The instruments include the second lag of the dependent 
variable and first lags of the explanatory variables in both the transformed and 
untransformed form. 
